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OPERATIONAL MEMORANDUM

MGB-A-301

BSC/Ops/126

Berlin

14 August 1947

TO : C

FROM : C

SUBJECT : CALESA <sup>noted</sup> -- Termination of Project

REF : BSC/Ops/118 and 119

1. CALESA was met at 1000 hours, 2 August 1947, at the Dahlem Dorf U-Bahn Station. He opened the conversation by stating that since the last meeting with case officer he came to the conclusion that the original plan, which called for his contacting the Russians at the Pankow rendezvous, was too dangerous, especially in view of the fact that the MVD must be chagrined at the failure of C and to report back. CALESA stated he had a feeling that the original plan could not succeed and was, therefore, considering another possibility to contact the Russian Intelligence Service.

2. CALESA claimed to have discussed the project with a friend, a merchant who is said to have excellent relations with the "headquarters of the NKVD". This friend (whose name CALESA refused to reveal) advised him against meeting the Russians at Pankow, and suggested instead contacting a certain ANTONOV, allegedly a high ranking civilian with the NKVD in Berlin-Koepenick.

Field Comment: It was clear from the interrogation that CALESA was unwilling to undertake the operation for which he volunteered without pressure on our part. It may be said in his defense that the part called for such a measure of courage and daring as only those motivated by ideological reasons are usually found to possess. CALESA was definitely not one of those. CALESA's alternate plan--to contact the Russians through the unnamed merchant--was not taken at face value; he was told clearly that we were neither interested in this second project, nor willing to assume any responsibility for running it. He was, however, not forbidden to make contact with the Russians.

3. On 7 August 1947 CALESA reported that he had established contact with the Russian Intelligence Service, as per schedule, and that his cover story was well received. He claimed to have met with a Russian Colonel who, although understandably suspicious, was anxious to recruit CALESA for service with the RIS. Future plans were discussed only

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vaguely, but the Russian was said to have been interested in the abduction of [redacted], and in obtaining copies of false documents printed for CALESA and [redacted]. The next meeting was scheduled for the following day.

Field Comment: CALESA wrote a detailed, 4-page report about his alleged meeting with the Russians. While the report had a ring of truth to it, and was on the whole credible, [redacted] agreed that the possibility of a hoax was so strong, especially in view of CALESA's well known over-active imagination, that no definite conclusion could be reached for the time being as to the validity of CALESA's statements.

4. On 8 and 9 August 1947 CALESA again reported on his contacts with the Russians. Little new information was submitted and under questioning CALESA became noticeably more vague. It was noticed by the case officer that all information which CALESA reported as having been received from the Russians was about eight months old, i.e. CALESA could conceivably have obtained it prior to his evacuation from Berlin in December 1946. His next meeting with the Russians, CALESA stated, was to take place at 2300 hours, Saturday, 9 August 1947, in front of the Staats Oper (State Opera), Friedrich Strasse, Russian Sector.

Field Comment: CALESA was asked to draw a sketch of the proposed meeting place, and definitely indicate where he was going to be at 2300 hours. The resulting sketch was detailed enough to eliminate the possibility of mistaking the meeting place. Accordingly, it was placed under observation between 2245 and 2310 hours on 9 August 1947. The four observers (one of whom knew CALESA well) agreed that no one answering his description was to be seen around 2300 hours at the place indicated.

5. At our next meeting on 11 August 1947 CALESA reported that he met the Russians at 2300 hours on 9 August, as scheduled. He asked if we had the place under observation. We stated it was against American policy to conduct operations in the Russian Sector, but that we did send a large, red, American sedan to Friedrich Strasse, and this car kept cruising down the street in search of any unusual RIS activity. CALESA replied he remembered the car very well and had wondered what an American vehicle was looking for in that neighborhood.

Field Comment: Naturally, there was no such car; its existence was suggested merely to test once more CALESA's credibility, or rather lack of same.

CALESA produced a report on Saturday's "meeting", but it was such a combination of invention and conjecture that [redacted] decided it was conclusive of CALESA's bad faith in the matter. This view, however, was not communicated to CALESA, and the interview closed on friendly terms.

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Field Comment: In view of the above, the CALESA Project must be considered terminated. The Chief of Station will decide what course to adopt toward CALESA. It still needs to be established whether he was actually contacted in Wiesbaden, or whether the whole project was merely a figment of his imagination by which he hoped to get back into "active service" in Berlin. It should be stated that, from the beginning, all concerned with the case had serious mental reservations regarding CALESA's suitability as a double. On the other hand, the cost of the project was merely food for CALESA, and his story was never taken at face value. We were willing to sponsor him as a controlled double only in view of the special circumstances under which the project came about. The need to ascertain how and why the [ ] CALESA, and [ ] collapsed is still imperative. It is to be regretted that this project did nothing to bring us nearer the goal.

TO: FBM for SC Wash 1st Ind

Approved.

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